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CHAPTER VII
The Determinants of Turkish Exports
It has already been seen that there were strong differential incentives in
favor of import.substituting production in both the 1950's and the 1960's; In
the 1950's the disincentives to export were the consequences of currency
overvaluation and the resulting premia arising from import stringency. In the
1960's these differential incentives were partly the result of deliberate govern-
ment policy, although that policy itself was based to a considerable extent
upon pessimism about the potential for export growth. Even in the 1960's,
however, part of the differential incentive against exports was unintended, in
the sense that import stringency was greater than had been planned; and the
premia on imports were therefore higher than had been anticipated or in-
tended by the planners. The resource-allocational effects of the differential
incentive to export are examined in this chapter. First, an overview of the
behavior of exports over the period 1950 to 1971 is presented, and the
structure of export earnings is examined. Next, government domestic policies,
which are very important for understanding the determinants of both the
production and the volume of exports of certain commodities, are discussed.
Thereafter the behavior of individual export commodities is analyzed. Final-
ly, estimates of the effects of exchange-rate policy on export earnings are
presented.
I. Behavior and structure of exports, 1950 to 1971
Export earnings
Table Vu-i presents annual data on the dollar value of Turkish exports,
Turkey's share of world exports, and the share of Turkish exports in Turkish
GNP over the 1950-to-1971 period. Turkey's exports rose to $396 million in
1953, representing 0.54 per cent of world exports. Turkey's exports had
declined to $247 million by 1958, and Turkey's share of the world market
had fallen by more than half, to 0.26 per cent. Turkey did not reattain her
1953 export earnings until 1964, when exports reached $41 1million, al-
though her share of world exports in that year was barely above the 1958
level. Turkey's exports then grew at almost the same rate as world exports
from 1964 to 1967; thereafter, Turkey's share fell to 0.21 per cent in 1970,
although exports had risen in absolute value to $588 million.180
Table Vu-i
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Notes:a) EER-adjusted exports as a share of GNP were calculated by multiplying
dollar export values by the weighted average EER for exports. The adjustment
is made to reflect the actual earnings of exporters as a proportion of GNP.
b) Export data do not entirely agree with the data in Table 1-6. The source of
the discrepancies is not known.
Sources: Turkish and world exports from International Financial Statistics, various
issues. Turkish exports in TL from Statistical Yearbook, SIS 1968; and Yak
Programa, State Planning Organization, 1971.
Accompanying the Turkish loss of share in world markets, the TL value of
exports as a percentage of GNP declined from 7.1 per cent in 1952 to 3.7 per
cent in 1969, according to official Turkish figures on the TL value of exports.
But these official figures are misleading, especially for the period 1956
through 1960, as dollar receipts were converted into TL at the official de fure
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exchange rate. To adjust for this, dollar export earnings were multiplied by
the weighted export EERs to obtain a more meaningful estimate of income
accruing to exporters in Turkey. The next-to-last column gives the official
figures, and the last column of Table VII.1 gives the export share of current
GNP when the TL value of exports is based upon EERs rather than the
official exchange rate. As can be seen, even with that adjustment exports fell
from 7 per cent of GNP in the early 1950's to 3.8 per cent of GNP in 1958,
rose to 5.8 per cent of GNP in 1961, and declined thereafter to 3.9 per cent
of GNP in 1968.
In keeping with the delineation of Phases in Chapter 1, several subperiods
can be distinguished. (1) From 1953 to 1958, exports declined precipitously
in dollar value, in volume, and as a percentage of GNP. The true magnitude of
the decline during the 1950's was probably even greater than the data in
Table VlI.1 suggest, as the bilateral debt.payment trading agreements (see
Chapter II) undoubtedly led to an overstatement of the value of export earn-
ings.' (2) Exports rose and the Turkish share of world trade rose after the
devaluation in 1958, as did exports as a percentage of GNP. The relative levels of
the early 1950's were by no means reattained, however. (3) The rate of
expansion of export earnings decreased after 1965, and the share of Turkish
exports in world trade and in Turkish GNP once again resumed its decline,
which continued until 1968—1969. Thus, even using the export EERs to value
export earnings in TL, 1968 exports were 3.9 per cent of GNP, contrasted
with 5.6 per cent and more in the early 1960's. Turkey's share of world trade
had declined yet more sharply, from 0.35 per cent in 1959 to 0.21 per cent in
1970.
Composition of exports
Table VII•2 gives data on the structure of Turkish exports. Tobacco and
cotton have been the largest foreign-exchange earning commodities. They
jointly accounted for about 40 per cent of total foreign-exchange earnings
from exports. Cotton exports increased markedly both in relative and in
absolute importance, whereas tobacco exports declined relatively as a source
of foreign exchange. Four additional commodity groups are important in
Turkish exports: hazelnuts (filberts); dried fruit (raisins and figs); and two
minerals, chrome and copper. The relative importance of the minerals has
declined over time, whereas that of the fresh and dried fruit and nuts has
increased. Turkish exports of fresh fruit began increasing rapidly in the late
1960's.
1. It will be recalled that the bilateral debt repayment agreements enabled Turkey to
port at above-world prices.1952 1956 1960 1964 1967 1970
Commodity group
Cereals 93.4 28.2 6.6 6.0 1.6 1.5
Fresh fruit 1.4 2.3 2.2 3.6 8.3 10.3
Dried fruit 15.7 19.9 29.8 30.5 31.6 30.8
Hazelnuts 18.4 29.8 39.2 50.2 84.3 87.0
Livestock products 5.7 5.7 13.5 20.5 17.6 27.7
Lumber 2.9 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.9 3.8
Animal feed 6.5 12.3 10.6 17.4 n.a. n.a.
Mohair 5.7 9.5 9.5 5.9 8.9 3.8
Cotton 69.1 26.4 46.1 92.3 131.5 171.3
Tobacco 62.1 93.6 65.5 90.1 118.0 78.5
Olive oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 6.8 0.0
Sugar 0.2 0.8 16.5 19.9 n.a. n.a.
Minerals 46.5 48.0 31.4 26.8 37.9 54.4
Other 35.3 27.3 48.6 42.5 74.3 119.4
Total 362.9 305.0320.7410.8522.7 588.5
Note: Sugar and animal feed are included in other exports for 1967 and 1970.
Sources:1952 to 1964,Economic and Social Indicators —Turkey,USAID, April 1965.
1967 and 1970, Economic and Social Indicators —Turkey,USAID, August
Although Turkey has a wide variety of export products, most of them are
agricultural commodities. Thus 87 per cent of Turkish exports originated in
agriculture, 8.1 per cent in minerals, and 4.9 per cent in manufactures in
1968. Although some agricultural commodities, e.g., citrus fruits, represent
exports, the bulk are traditional.
Table VII-3 gives data on Turkey's share of the world export markets for
her major exports. Turkey was at one time the world's leading exporter of
chrome, but her share has declined sharply over the years. Turkish exports of
copper constitute a very small fraction of world exports, and the Turkish
share has decreased over time. Of all Turkey's exports, there are only three
for which Turkey's share exceeds 15 per cent: raisins, figs and hazelnuts.
Thus it is doubtful whether Turkey has any significant monopoly power for
more than 85 per cent of her export earnings. The structure of Turkish
exports in this regard is decidedly more favorable than that of many develop-
ing countries. Although the share of Turkey's three top export commodities
in Turkish exports (about 55 per cent) is about average for the developing
countries, Turkey's share of her markets is generally low,2 and most Turkish
2. Michaely computed a coefficient of export concentration of 0.397 for Turkey in
182 The Determinants of Turkish Exports
Table VI1-2
Structure of Turkish exports, 1952 to 1970, selected years (millions of U.S. dollars)
T
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Table VI1-3
Turkey's share of world markets, various years (percentage of world exports)
1953 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969
Chrome 18.0 20.0 11.0 9.9 10.5 12.3
Copper 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5
Cotton na. 2.0 2.1 3.6 6.0 5.5
Figs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 65.9 69.7
Hazelnuts n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 47.1 66.7
Mohair 0.0 — 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1
Olive oil 1.1 n.a. 0.1 8.9 2.2 9.1
Citrus fruit n.a. 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.0
Raisins n.a. 16.7 23.6 16.4 16.5 18.2
Tobacco n.a. 12.0 7.5 5.1 9.2 7.1
Note:Data for chrome, copper and figs represent Turkey's share of world produc-
tion, not of world exports.
Sources:Minerals: Statistical Summary of the Mineral Industry, Great Britain, Director-
ate of Colonial Geological Surveys, various issues. Agricultural Commodities:
Trade Yearbook, FAO, various issues. Shares for figs and hazelnuts from World
Agriculture Production and Trade, USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Febru-
ary and September 1971.
exports are commodities for which there is reason to believe that the income
and price elasticities of demand are reasonably high.
1954, compared to coefficients of 3.11 for developed countries and 0.558 for under-
developed countries. Michael Michaely, Concentration in International Trade. North-
Holland (Amsterdam), 1962, pp. 11—12 and 16.
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Geographic distribution of exports
Table VH-4 gives data on the share of exports going to various trade blocs:
the EEC countries, the EFTA countries, the United States, the CMEA coun-
tries, and others. About one-third of Turkey's exports are destined for the
EEC, which Turkey plans to join. As indicated in Chapter I, Turkey signed
the initial protocol in 1963 but received little more than tariff-quota prefer-
ences until 1970. Thus the preferences extended by the EEC countries
through 1970 did not affect the volume of Turkey's exports to the EEC,
since tariff quotas simply allowed for reduced duties on a given quantity of
exports.
The EEC and other Western European countries are Turkey's natural
major trading partners, as Table V114 indicates. They jointly account for over











Source:Can, op. cit. (Note 3),
commodity, since a frequer
under bilateral trading agreen
In addition to bilateral a
has had bilateral agreements
those agreements (included i
cent of exports in 1955, 3.9
tance during the 1960's.3
Thus bilateral agreement
1950's, and there are no d
agreements for that period.
agreements upon the expo
1960's can be gleaned Iron
give the average unit price
bilateral agreements and fo
prices received under bilat
world market prices for
prices for mohair. These five
variation. For example, pr
averaged 13 per cent
1964 to 1968, however, the
6 and 18 per cent,
184
Table VlI.4
Geographic distribution of Turkish exports, 1950 to 1971
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(percentage of total exports)
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Note:Totals do not always add to 100.0 due to rounding.
Sources:Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations, various issues; and
Economic and Social Indicators —Turkey,USAID, 1965 and 1972.
Turkish exports, although in recent years the U.S. share has declined sub stan-
tially.
Perhaps the most striking feature of Table VII-4 is the marked fluctuations
in the share of the CMEA countries in Turkey's exports. The changes in
shares accord closely with the delineation of Phases indicated above. In
Phases II and III bilateral agreements have increased in absolute and relative
importance for Turkey's exports. The share of CMEA countries has been
considerably smaller during Phases I and IV.
Turkey has used bilateral trade agreements to sell her exports when they
have not sold well on the free international market. Thus the dollar and
physical volume figures for exports of given commodities do not accurately
reflect the true "competitiveness" of the Turkish export position in any given
3. Tevtik Can,AnlalmaliMeml
936-IPD 298, August 1970.
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than it is for the export co
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Chrome 23.56 20.86 32.29 35.01
Cotton 614.36 567.43 11.03 11.83
Hazelnuts 1149.61 1098.37 17.46 18.13
Hides and skins 1293.23 886.22 35.37 44.40
Mohair 1970.39 1959.76 56.54 56.67
Oilcakes 78.72 76.62 12.70 13.00
Raisins 319.44 317.37 25.24 25.37
Tobacco 1470.11 1314.87 14.80 16.27
commodity, since a frequently used mechanism was to sell the "surplus"
under bilateral trading agreements.
In addition to bilateral agreements made with CMEA countries, Turkey
has had bilateral agreements with Egypt, Israel and Yugoslavia. Exports under
those agreements (included in "other" in Table V114) accounted for 8.1 per
cent of exports in 1955, 3.9 per cent in 1960, and declined in relative impor-
tance during the 1960's.3
Thus bilateral agreements were more important quantitatively in the
1950's, and there are no data available on prices and quantities under the
agreements for that period. Some idea of the quantitative effects of bilateral
agreements upon the export statistics for individual commodities in the
1960's can be gleaned from the data in Table VII-5. The first two columns
give the average unit price of exports over the period 1964 to 1968, under
bilateral agreements and for free foreign exchange. As can be seen, average
prices received under bilateral agreements ranged from 45 per cent above
world market prices for hides and skins to virtual panty with international
prices for mohair. These five.year averages obscure a great deal of year-to-year
variation. For example, prices for chrome sold under bilateral agreements
averaged 13 per cent above prices for sales in convertible currencies. From
1964 to 1968, however, the annual percentage differences were —2, 2, 17 and
6 and 18 per cent, respectively.4 Similarly, the percentage by value of chrome
3. Tevfik Can, Anltqmali Memleketler ile Olan Ticarer Ek. 1-A, DPT
936-IPD 298, August 1970.
4. Obtaining meaningful unit value comparisons on the import side is far more difficult
than itis for the export commodities. Can did, however, obtain some data. The
prices (dollars per ton) of Turkish imports under bilateral agreements and from
Determinants of Turkish Exports
1971 (percentage oftotal exports)
CMEA Other
Countries
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exported under bilateral agreements was 26, 29, 24, 42, and 54 per cent,
respectively, of total chrome exports in each of the five years. Other corn- Export EERs,
modities show similar fluctuations.
There is every reason to believe that the bilateral agreements of the 1950's Export EERs
resulted in even larger discrepancies in unit values than in the 1960's. The
TraditionalNon. prevalence of "switch deals," the general uncompetitiveness of Turkish cx- Tradit
ports, and the larger percentage of total exports taking place under bilateral
agreements in the 1950's (not to mention the arrangements 1953 2.80 3.92
discussed in Chapter II) all indicate that the data on individual commodities 1954 2.85 4.48
were significantly affected by the extent of trade under bilaterals. This should 1955 2.89 4.50
be borne in mind when interpreting the data on individual commodities 1956 2.91 5.00




II. Government policies affecting exports
1961 9.00 9.00
1962 9.00 9.00
Government policies affecting a wide range of exports are examined in this 1963 9.00 9.00
section. First, attention is given to exchange-rate policy and its interaction 1964 9.00 9.62
with domestic price policies. Second, the practice of "price registration" and 1965 9.00 9.69
"price inspection" is discussed. Third, export licensing procedures are exam- 1966 9.00 10.09
id. Finally, government policies affecting non-traditional exports are anal- 1967 9.02 9.72
yzed. 1968 9.02 10.28
1969 9.37 10.31 In addition to policies affecting a wide range of exports, there were many
1970 12.15 15.12
domestic policies affecting specific export commodities. Those policies are 1971 13.20 16.50
examined below, when the behavior of individual export commodities is dis-
cussed. Note: PLD-EERS were comp
until 1968. Thereafter
was linked to the Exchange rate policy
Sources:Appendix A for 1953
Table VII-6 summarizes the exchange rates applicable to different catego- weighted PLD-EER for tradi
ries of export transactions in the 1953-to-1971 period. As can be seen, the 1953 and 1957, and then ro
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convertible currency countries were: 1969. For traditional expo
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Polyethylene 385—405 363—374 devaluation resulted in a gre
Zinc chromate 570 530—550 exports5 than for traditional
The last column of Table
Data are from ibid., p. 9. Thus the evidence suggests that import and export prices
have probably been inflated by about the same proportions. 5. See Appendix C, below, for deDeterminants of Turkish Exports The Anatomy of the Regime in the 1960's 187
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Table VIl-6
Export EERs, PLD.EERs, and export—import EER differentials, 1953 to 1971

























































































































Note:PLD-EERs were computed by dividing nominal EERs by home-goods prices
until 1968. Thereafter the percentage increase in the wholesale price index
was linked to the home-goods price index.
Sources:Appendix A for 1953 to 1969. Appendix C for 1970 and 1971.
weighted PLD-EER for traditional exports declined by 44 per cent between
1953 and 1957, and then rose 32 per cent above the 1953 level by 1960. It
gradually declined during the 1960's, reaching 93 per cent of its 1953 level in
1969. For traditional exports, the 1970 devaluation brought the real ex-
change rate back only to its 1965 level. Non-traditional exports have fared
somewhat better: except during the early 1960's, the EER has been above
that for traditional exports; the PLD-EER declined somewhat less for non-
traditional exports before 1958 and again during the 1960's; and the 1970
devaluation resulted in a greater increase in the PLD-EER for non-traditional
exports5 than for traditional exports.
The last column of Table VII-6 gives the ratio of the weighted export EER
5. See Appendix C, below, for details.188 The Determinants of Turkish Exports
to the import EER over the period. Except for the 1957 to 1959 period, the
relationship between the TL receipts for exports and the TL cost of imports
has been remarkably constant, ranging between 0.5 and 0.6. Although the
import EER does not measure the full differential incentive toward import-
substituting production —becausequantitative restrictions meant that the
domestic price could be above landed cost and because new import-substi-
tuting production was protected by removing the commodity from the list of
eligible imports —thefact is that the structure of taxes and duties on imports
resulted in a substantial disparity between incentives for export and those for
import-competing production, even without regard to the effects of quotas
and import prohibitions. Despite the 1958 devaluation, there was little
change in the ratio of export and import EERs between the 1950's and the
1960's. There was if anything a greater differential in the 1960's than in the
1950's.
Under optimal resource allocation, the incentive for import-substituting
and export production would be equal at the margin.6 Even if one interprets
the non-traditional export EER as the marginal rate, itis evident that ex-
change-rate policy has led to a wide and persistent differential in incentives
over the entire twenty-year period. Despite the fact that economic policy was
much more closely coordinated with development goals in the 1960's than in
the 1950's, discrimination against exports has been about the same through-
out the two decades.
In subsequent efforts to trace the resource-allocational effects of the trade
policies, the fact of the relative constancy of incentives should be borne in
mind. There has been no time during the period under review when there
have not been substantially greater rewards for home market production than
for exports. As such, the export response examined below is one that oc-
curred when disincentives were reduced or increased: there are no observa-
tions of what would have happened under equal incentives, or for that mat-
ter, under greater incentive for export than for import-substitution.
Price inspect ion and price registration
The practice of price registration during the 1950's was discussed in Chap-
terII. In essence, registered prices for various exports during the 1950's
became minimum prices at which exports were permitted. It has already been
seen that these prices, although designed to "protect exporters" and to
prevent capital flight, undoubtedly led to the preclusion of some exports and
the diversion of others to "switch deals" with Eastern Europe.
6. This statement holds even with monopoly power in trade, since optimal export
"taxes" would appropriately equalize marginal incentives.
I
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Price registration continued in the 1960's although it appears that the
actual administration of the system was less onerous than the "minimum export
prices" of the 1950's. For some commodities, e.g., chrome, price regis-
tration and related price policies continued to be unrealistic, with a continued
loss of markets for Turkey.
The intent of price registration in the 19 60's was:
or the purpose of obtaining information in advance with a view to the conditions
of exportation, facilitating the pursuance of commodity and price policy, avoiding
artificial fluctuations, warning the exporters in regard to differences noticed in the
prices of the same export commodities at the same time, as well as furnishing the
persons concerned with information when and if required.
During the process of registration, the authorities provide standardization of
prices registered, making allowance for qualitative differences, of any commodity to
be exported to any monetary area...7
The list of commodities for which registration was required prior to exporta-
tion was:8
For most of the commodities on the list registered prices appear to have
been set at reasonable levels, in contrast to the 1950's. While the practice of
price registration was by no means a dead letter, the deleterious effects upon
exports were undoubtedly much less than before, which was due both to the
reduced scope of the requirement and to its more benevolent administration.
7. "Regulation Concerning Foreign Trade Affairs," Part I, Article 5, Official Gazette,
No. 12040, July 5, 1965.
8. Ibid., lists I and H.
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Those commodities not subject to price registration requirements were still
subject to a price declaration by the exporter at the time of shipment. The
declarations submitted by exporters were subject, in principle, to ex-post
inspection, and the authorities were empowered to require the exporter to
surrender additional foreign exchange if the selling price was deemed unreal-
istically low. In practice, exporters were rarely confronted ex-shipment about
their export prices in the 1960's, and interviews with exporters did not yield
complaints about price inspections. However, such a set of administrative
procedures undoubtedly created some uncertainty at the margin and could
not have encouraged Turkish producers to be overly zealous in attempting to
invade new export markets.
Export licensing
Export licenses were required for a variety of commodities throughout the
1953-to-1970 period. Ministerial permission was needed to obtain an export
license in those cases, and licenses were not necessarily granted automatically.
The relevant ministries were charged with: "...regulating offers and demands
within domestic and foreign markets, avoiding speculation, and giving con-
sideration to the conditions of local and foreign markets and to the require-
ments of this country."9 Thus virtually all cereals required export licenses
prior to exportation. Nuts, raisins, several metal ores, all articles containing
precious metals and stones, and margarine were subject to export licensing, as
were various other commodities from time to time.'
Export promotion policies
As seen above, import EERs were considerably above export EERs
throughout the l950-to-l970 period. This occurred despite the fact that
premia were accorded to exports during the 1950's and export rebates were
employed after 1963. The operation of the premium system was examined in
Chapter II and therefore need not be dealt with here. In a sense, the premia as
well as the rebates constituted a measure reducing the differential against
exports rather than an export promotion measure. Rebate rates are given in
Appendix A, and their net effect on EERs is included in Table VII-6.
The export premia of the 1950's and the rebates of the 1960's were the
most significant export incentives, or partial offsets to disincentives, in the
Turkish foreign trade regime. Here we focus upon those miscellaneous govern-
ment policies that affected exports.
9.Ibid.,Article 6.
10. Meat exports rose sharply after the 1970 devaluation, and the domestic price of meat
increased drastically. Meat exports were then banned.
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11. See Fry, op. cit. (Note 30,
12. Monthly Bulletin, Central BIExport credits.Turkish interest rates have been regulated by legal ceil-
ings imposed upon the banks. Since these ceilings have been below market-
clearing interest rates, credit rationing has resulted. The statutory interest rate
ceilings remained constant from 1961 to 1968. Loans for financing agricul-
ture and exports were set at a 9.0 per cent nominal rate of interest, which
with taxes and other charges was actually a 13.5 per cent nominal interest
rate. Loans for other purposes were made at the nominal rate of 10.5 per
cent, which was 15 per cent including taxes. Thus exporters were provided
with a subsidy of about1 .5 per cent on the interest cost of their loans.
Several features of the banking system, however, prevented the lower interest
rate from having much effect. Most important was that the banks had little
incentive .to lend at these rates, given the excess demand for loans. Conse-
quently, there were generally hidden charges which absorbed the difference in
interest rates and perhaps even raised the actual rate of interest above the
legal maximum when loans were made at subsidized rates.'Given the fact of
credit rationing, moreover, additional exports did not automatically entitle
exporters to additional credit at the subsidized rate. Thus itis doubtful
whether the 1 .5 per cent interest rate differential, even when it existed, did
more than channel some funds to firms which were, at any event, exporting.
The government abolished the transaction tax and stamp duties on export
financing operations in the fall of 1968, and reduced the nominal interest rate
on export credits from 9 to 6 per cent. This constituted a reduction in the
effective nominal rate of interest from 13.5 per cent to about 9 per cent. The
export credit scheme was not quantitatively important even in its amended
form. Central Bank credits extended for export financing purposes rose from
TL 30 million in 1961 to TL 120 million in 1965 and TL 388 million in
1969, representing 1.4, 1.2, and 2.0 per cent, respectively, of all Central Bank
credits,' 2and0.8, 2.9 and 8 per cent of exports in those years. Given the
11. See Fry, op. cit. (Note 30, Chap. II), pp. 142 ff. for a fuller discussion.
12. Monthly Bulletin, Central Bank, October-December 1971, pp. 18—2 1.
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On the books, there were a few export incentives in addition to the rebate
system operative during most of the 1960's. By and large, those incentives
began in the mid-1960's and like rebates assumed somewhat greater impor-
tance toward the end of the decade. Even then they were generally quantita.
tively unimportant, both in their effect upon EERs and in the total receipts
of exporters, and hence deserve only brief mention here. These measures
included: (1) export credits at subsidized rates of interest; (2) attempts at
export promotion; (3) an increased probability of receiving favorable treat-
ment when dealing with government officials if one were exporting; and (4)
an import replenishment scheme.
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small amount of Central Bank credit extended for export financing, itis
unlikely that export credit subsidization constituted more than a very small
incentive to exports at the margin.
Export promotion.The second export measure was airected toward
promoting Turkish exports abroad, but this promotion was done on a very
small scale. Individual businessmen found it difficult to obtain foreign exchange
(except by paying the 50 per cent foreign travel tax) for purposes of foreign
promotion of'their products, and little was done at the government level.
Although an Export Promotion Agency was established in the mid-1960's, its
budget was very small and its primary function until 1967 was to administer
export rebates. Despite expert recommendations and pleas from private ex-
porters, efforts at export promotion were very limited. For example, the
annual budget for promotion of hazelnut exports was $40,000, all of which
was spent in the United States.'Thus government provisions for export
promotion efforts in the 1960's would have to be judged relatively insignifi-
cant compared with the incentives for import-substitution.
One indication of the failure to adopt serious export promotion measures
was inaction with regard to export standards. It was widely recognized that
Turkish exports could be aided considerably if grading and quality standards
were adopted and enforced by the government. But despite repeated techni-
cal advice to establish such standards, the government took little action.
Many exporters claimed that their markets were spoiled by competitors with
inferior or low quality products. Complaints about low quality were heard
frequently in interviews both with Turkish exporters and with foreign import-
ers of Turkish goods. The failure of the government to take positive action
was symptomatic of its general policy toward exports.
Favored treatment to exporters.The next export incentive, a height-
ened probability of favorable government treatment in connection with ad-
ministration of government regulations, is difficult to evaluate. Except that
exports were deemed a "priority" sector and investments in industries that
planned to export were accorded the same treatment as "priority" import-
substituting investments, there was no legal provision for favored treatment
of exporting firms. In interviews, however, some exporters claimed that if
they could cover marginal costs in exporting it was worth their while to do so
because they would receive slightly preferential treatment on other matters.
This was undoubtedly more important for non-traditional exporters than it
was for the exporters of traditional commodities, but even then preferential
treatment was generally a relatively small incentive.
13. Turkish Exports: Problems and Opportunities, USAID (Ankara), 1967, p. 12.
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Import replenishment.There was no scheme under which exporters
could replace imports used in the production of goods for export before
1968. When import shortages limited production, the absence of an import
replenishment scheme constituted a sizeable deterrent to exports.
In 1968 an import replenishment scheme was adopted under which a
special quota of $2 million was set aside for import replenishment.'The
amount allocated remained at $2 million even in 1970, and was under the
control of the State Planning Organization.'Immediately after the introduc-
tion of the scheme, exporters of non-traditional goods declared the scheme to
be inadequate on the grounds that paperwork, delays, and the relatively small
amount of the quota meant that the scheme would not serve its purpose.
They requested, through the Union of Chambers, an automatic 30 per cent re-
tention of their export earnings instead.'
6The request was not acted upon,
and the $2 million quota remained the only source of replenishment.
Either because it was too new or because of paperwork and other factors,
exporting firms generally regarded the import replenishment scheme as being
of little value. As with other export incentives the scheme was probably of
use only to a few firms and did not constitute an across.the-board incentive
for exports.
The picture that emerges in general is that little was done by the govern-
ment to encourage exports during the 1960's. Although measures such as the
reduced export interest rate were taken, they were generally far less strong
than comparable measures to encourage import.substitution industries. By
and large, government policies designed to encourage import-substitution pro.
vided far more powerful incentives than those aimed at increased export
earnings. This general impression is reinforced when consideration is given to
measures surrounding individual export commodities, to which we now turn.
III. Behavior of individual export commodities
In addition to the generally greater incentives for than
for exporting, a number of government policies specific to individual com-
modities further affected the relative attractiveness of exporting. In this sec-
tion the features of the foreign trade regime as they influenced export com-
modities and the domestic policies with which those features interacted are
examined, along with other institutional factors relevant to the analysis. The
major export commodities —tobacco,cotton, hazelnuts, chrome, and copper
14. Decree No. 6/10649, September 13, 1968.
15. Decree No. 6/12856, January 5, 1970.
16. EIU, op. cit. (Note 1, Chap. 11), No. 4, November 1968, p. 7.
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—areconsidered first. Thereafter, some minor export commodities are dis-
cussed.
Tobacco
Table VIl-7 gives basic data on Turkish production, exports and position
in the world tobacco market. Taking the averages of 1950 to 1952 and
comparing them with the 1967-to-1969 period, Turkish production increased
by 72 per cent over the 17-year interval, while exports increased by 47 per
cent in volume. Foreign exchange earnings from tobacco thus grew at an
average annual rate of 1.39 per cent.'Since world trade in unmanufactured
tobacco grew by 70 per cent over the same time period, Turkey's share of the
world tobacco market declined somewhat, falling from 9.6 per cent in the
1950-to-l952 period to 8.3 per cent in 1967 to 1969.
Although Turkish tobacco is not a perfect substitute for other tobaccos,
Bulgarian and Greek tobaccos are major competitors, averaging almost twice
the volume of Turkish exports. The last two columns of Table V1l.7 give the
ratios of Turkish export prices to the Greek and American export prices,
respectively, as given by the IMF.
The very high ratios of the Turkish prices to the Greek and American
prices in the 1953.to:1959 period reflect several factors: (1) the mechanism
for debt repayment under bilateral trading arrangements with the Western
European countries (discussed in Chapter II) under which foreign importers
had to accept high Turkish prices if they wished to receive even partial
repayment for their loans; (2) the large share of trade with Eastern European
countries whose average prices paid were higher than prices in Western
tries during those years; and (3) the relatively high prices charged by Turkey
in the 1953-to-1959 period.
Domestic agricultural price policies are an important determinant of
Turkish tobacco exports. 18Fordomestic production of manufactured tobac-
co products, there is a State Monopoly. The State Monopoly inspects the
tobacco crop each year and makes each farmer an offer of a price for his
crop, taking into account the quality and condition of the harvest. The offer
is open and there is no time limit upon its acceptance.
Meanwhile private merchants who buy tobacco only for the export trade
17. The irregular growth of tobacco export earnings can be seen by the poor fit of the
regression equation:
ETt =662(10139)t
where ET are millions of dollars of tobacco exports, and t1 in 1950. R20.167
and the standard error of the time trend is 0.004.
18. This section draws on Forker, op. cit. (Note 24, Chap. II).
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1950 93 51 55
1951 89 58 65
1952 92 57 62
1953 118 72 61
1954 102 64 63
1955 120 60 50
1956 117 61 52
1957 123 88 72
1958 115 56 49
1959 129 67 52
1960 139 58 42
1961 101 88 87
1962 90 91 101
1963 132 45 34
1964 194 57 29
1965 132 68 52
1966 164 85 52
1967 182 92 50
1968 163 81 50
1969 147 71 48
1970 138 74 54
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can also bid for the crop, and do so after the State Monopoly offers have
been made. Thus the State Monopoly's offer in effect sets a floor under the
export price. When the State Monopoly ends up purchasing more of the crop
than it uses it can either add to inventories or sell at a loss. When the latter
has occurred, "the merchants complained bitterly."9 Forker concludes that,
"Essentially the State Monopoly acts as a benevolent price leader that does
not retaliate, but ...hasadequate resources to cover its mistakes."2°
The Monopoly has exported over the years, although the magnitude of its
exports is not known. Forker obtained data for the period 1961 to 1965:
19. Forker. op. cit. (Note 24, Chap. II), p. 25.
20.Ibid.
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Table Vu-i
Tobacco production and exports, and Turkish share of world market
195
Source:Production and exports from SIS. World exports from Trade Yearbook, FAO,
various issues; price data from International Financial Statistics. Data for 1970
and 1971 from Economic and Social Indicators —Turkey,USAID, 1972. important determinant of
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over that five-year interval exports were 20,000 metric tons greater than
merchants' purchases had been over the period. Most striking in this regard
was 1962, when the monopoly price of TL 11.75 per kilogram exceeded the
export price of TL 9.72 per kilogram. The price paid by merchants was TL
11.52. However, merchants purchased 39.1 ,000 metric tons, whereas exports
were 91 ,000 metric tons. Thus the very low relative price of Turkish tobacco
in 1962 (Table VIl.7) may reflect the State Monopoly's distress sales of the
commodity rather than other factors.
Data are not available to indicate the fraction of the crop sold under
bilateral trading arrangements, nor the inventory holdings of either merchants
or the State Monopoly over the entire period. Given the State Monopoly's
price policies, there must have been sizeable fluctuations from year to year in
both inventories and distress sales to Eastern Europe. For the period 1964 to
1968, for which Can's data are available, exports to bilateral-agreement coun-
tries ranged from 12 to 18 per cent of the value of Turkish exports.2 1
Forkerpoints out that tobacco production has increased more rapidly
than domestic consumption plus exports. He further notes that "the monopo-
ly practice of pricing the high-quality high-cost tobacco at a higher level than
the world market will bear, and the low quality at a lower price than the
market will bear is encouraging the exportation of lower quality Turkish
(oriental) tobacco."22 His calculations indicate that the Tobacco Monopoly's
intervention in the domestic market represented an annual subsidy of almost
8 per cent of the value of the crop for the 1962-to-l966 period.23
These considerations taken together suggest that domestic price support
for tobacco and the behavior of the State Monopoly have been the key
determinants of the quantity and value of Turkish tobacco exports. Given the
ability of the State Monopoly to sustain losses, it is hardly surprising that
tobacco exports appear to have been little affected (except perhaps by short-
term speculative behavior) by fluctuations in the real exchange rate or by the
1958 devaluation. As will be seen below, there is no statistical evidence that
tobacco exports have been influenced by changes in the real exchange rate,
nor by changes in the domestic-export price relationship.
Cotton
Table VII-8 presents data on Turkish production and exports of cotton, as
well as the domestic and export prices of cotton. As can be seen, cotton
production has increased rapidly over the period since 1950. Turkey has
21. Can, op. cit. (Note 3), Ek. LI-A.
22. cit. (Note 24, Chap.II), p. 48.
23. Ibid., p. 52.
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Note:Export data from the UN and those from SPO do not agree. For 1963, the
UN gives cotton exports as 134,000 metric tons. SPO data were used for the
1960's to obtain data for recent years.
Sources: Production data 1960-to-1969, Indices of Agricultural Production 1 960-
to-I 969, USDA, ERS-Foreign 265, April 1970. 1950-to-1959 data provided to
the author by USDA. 1970, Economic and Social Indicators— Thrkey, USAID,
1972. Exports 1950-to-1962, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, UN,
various issues. 1963.to-1970, Y,Ihk Ihracat 196 1-to-1966 and 1967-to-1970.
Export Prices, Monthly Bulletin, Central Bank, various issues. Domestic Prices,
Statistical Yearbook, SIS, various issues.
almost tripled the volume of cotton exports and dollar earnings of cotton
over the period, increasing her share of world cotton exports from 2 per cent
in 1957 to 6 per cent in 1967—1969. Thus earnings from cotton exports grew
at an average annual rate of 4.5 per cent.24
24. The regression equation is ECt =6.0(1.045)t,withR2 =0.27and the standard error
of the trend, 0.017.198 TheDeterminantsof Turkish Exports
Whereas tobacco was Turkey's largest single export in the 1950's, cotton
was the biggest foreign-exchange-earning commodity in the 1960's. Unlike
tobacco, the volume of cotton exports declined markedly in the middle
1950's, and cotton exports appear to be quite sensitive to changes in the real
exchange rate.25 Domestic consumption of cotton products has increased
markedly, and there is no evidence of any accumulation of stocks. Thus in
contrast to tobacco, increases in cotton exports require increases in domestic
production or diversion of production from domestic to foreign consump-
tion.
There appears to have been considerably less price intervention in the
domestic cotton market than has been true for other major Turkish exports.
A Union of Sales Cooperatives, essentially a government organization with
voluntary producer membership, is the vehicle by which price intervention
could occur, but Forker estimates that prices set by the Union have either
been below market clearing prices or there has been no intervention price set
during most of the years in the period under review.26 Thus conditions in the
cotton market have been primarily determined by market forces rather than
government intervention.
Hazelnuts
Table VII-9 provides data on the performance of hazelnut exports in the
period since 1950. Hazelnut exports have doubled in volume, and export
earnings have tripled as the international price of the nuts has risen. The
average annual growth of export value was thus 8.0 per cent.27 Ascan be
seen, there are sharp year-to-year fluctuations in production which have been
smoothed on the export side by government intervention.
The hazelnut sales cooperative, Fiskobirlik, is similar to the cotton sales
cooperative in its organization. About half the growers belong to it, although
purchases are also made from non-members. The government determines the
support price for the crop and lends the cooperative sufficient funds to
purchase all hazelnuts offered at that price. A minimum export price is also
set at the same time. Losses on export sales are not financed by the govern.
ment. Forker estimates that price intervention for the first half of the 1960's
amounted to a 7 per cent subsidy to hazelnut growers.28
Although Turkey's share in the hazelnut market is large, there is consider-
able evidence that the demand for hazelnuts is price-elastic. They are a close
25. See below, Section IV.
26. Forker, op. cit. (Note 24, Chap. II), p. 34.
27. The regression equation is EHt = with R2 =0.89and the standaid
error of the trend, 0.0065.
28. Forker, op. cit. (Note 24, Chap. II), p. 52.
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tons) tons) (TL/kg) (IL/kg)
1950 23 27 18.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1951 91 22 18.0 2.26 2.42 0.93
1952 73 26 18.4 2.19 2.00 1.09
1953 40 29 22.3 2.32 2.16 1.07
1954 115 31 25.0 2.75 2.48 1.11
1955 26 44 43.9 3.83 2.82 1.36
1956 65 24 29.5 3.91 3.54 1.10
1957 73 40 44.4 2.82 3.07 0.92
1958 100 32 27.6 4.33 2.63 1.65
1959 90 52 43.1 6.62 2.34 2.83
1960 59 42 39.2 8.76 9.06 0.97
1961 70 36 43.4 10.87 10.53 1.03
1962 90 44 56.0 12.30 11.56 1.06
1963 91 42 42.4 11.58 11.71 0.99
1964 16 49 50.2 9.54 9.25 1.03
1965 68 60 61.7 9.57 9.52 1.01
1966 190 56 53.2 9.58 9.46 1.01
1967 70 74 84.2 10.24 10.43 0.98
1968 132 65 75.9 10.95 10.82 1.01
1969 170 83 107.7 12.17 11.80 1.03
1970 225 46 87.0 12.84 15.97 0.80
1971 n.a. 65 81.3 14.53 17.17 0.85
4vith R2=0.89and the standard
Note:Export data are for shelled nuts; production data are for unshelled. Forker
estimates that about 90 per cent of the crop is exported.
Sources:Production and export data: same as Table Vl1-8. Price data from Forker, op.
cit. (Note 24, Chap. II); and Monthly Bulletin, Central Bank, various issues.
substitute for other nuts and are purchased primarily for baked goods, where
substitution possibilities as well as changes in ingredient proportions are sensi-
tive to relative changes in input prices. Forker points out that hazelnut export
earnings have been positively correlated with the volume exported, as is evi-
dent from Table VII-9. Demand for hazelnuts, moreover, has apparently be-
come more price elastic in the 1960's than it was in the
Given this, the government's policy of withholding supplies from the ex-
port market in good crop years is open to question. There have been years in
29.Ibid,, p. 32.200 TheDeterminants of Turkish Exports
which the minimum export price has been set well above international levels.
Thus in the fall of 1966, with a record crop, a high minimum export price
apparently adversely affected sales.3° Despite Turkey's share of the market
there is evidently no reason why other countries cannot develop hazelnut
production should Turkey over-use her short-term monopoly position. With
price-elastic demand, it is difficult to understand the need for active govern-
ment intervention to smooth year-to-year fluctuations in exports to the de-
gree that has been undertaken.
As with tobacco exports, government intervention policies have been the
major determinant of export volume and value, and market forces have not
been permitted to operate freely in the hazelnut market. As such, it has not
been exchange rate policy per se but rather domestic price policy and mini-
mum export prices that have determined the behavior of hazelnut exports.
Raisins and figs
Raisins and figs constitute the bulk of Turkey's dried fruit exports. As
indicated in Table VII-3 the Turkish share of the raisin market is sizeable, and
Turkey has more than half the world's exports of figs.
Table Vil-lO gives the basic data on production and exports of raisins and
figs. Export earnings from raisins have increased at an average annual rate of 4
per cent.3
1Ascan be seen, raisins are approximately three times as important
a source of foreign exchange earnings as are figs. Data on export value and
volume for figs are unavailable prior to 1954; the average annual rate of
growth of export earnings over the 16-year period was 4.9 per cent.
Since 1964, export prices for raisins —effectedthrough the relevant sales
cooperative —havebeen set on the basis of a trade agreement between
Turkey, Greece and Australia, with cooperation from Californian growers.
Price intervention by the cooperative in the domestic market has amounted
to an annual average subsidy of 8 per cent to growers, according to Forker's
estimates. Forker estimates that production is responsive to price increases
and that the intervention program has resulted in "more production and more
burdensome and costly stocks..."32 Thus domestic production has not lim-
ited exports, which have been determined primarily by government policies
with respect to export prices.
Fig exports are a relatively small fraction of total production, which has
tripled since the early 1950's. Although there has been subsidization of fig
30. Turkish Exports: Prospects and Problems, USAID (Ankara), 1967, pp.12 and25.
31. The regression equation estimated for the time trend of the value of raisin exports is:
ERt =4•6(1•0398)t,with t0 in 1950, R2 =0.46and the standard error of the time
trend, 0.010.
32. Forker, op. cit. (Note 24, Chap. II), p. 52.
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of metricof metric of dollars)of metricof metric of dollars)
tons) tons) to'ns) tons)
1950 69 80 21 86 n.a. n.a.
1951 52 35 11 107 n.a. n.a.
1952 68 44 11 118 n.a. n.a.
1953 64 33 7 105 n.a. n.a.
1954 65 53 11 107 12 3.3
1955 40 33 8 100 16 3.6
1956 100 48 15 121 16 3.6
1957 53 59 19 137 17 4.2
1958 65 49 18 155 17 3.6
1959 100 61 18 156 15 2.0
1960 67 82 23 145 35 6.9
1961 85 64 16 204 24 4.9
1962 90 69 16 210 30 5.7
1963 60 66 17 208 27 5.9
1964 73 52 17 206 25 6.1
1965 120 66 21 210 29 7.0
1966 75 68 22 215 28 6.7
1967 93 72 23 232 32 7.2
1968 103 75 23 215 32 7.0
1969 80 77 23 215 28 6.8
1970 n.a. 70 21 214 29 7.2
1971 n.a. 89 22 n.a. 32 8.6
Sources:Physical exports and production from Trade Yearbook, FAO, various issues;
export values from International Financial Statistics,International Monetary
Fund (Washington); Annual Foreign Trade Statistics, SIS; and Yearbook of
International Trade Statistics, United Nations.
production, Forker estimates that the intervention levels have generally been
below market levels since 1961, and hence that intervention has not signifi-
cantly affected the fig market.33 Evidently little attempt has been made to
develop fig exports into a year-round activity: fig exports have as yet been
realized only during the processing season. This has led to a loss of a fraction
of the crop due to labor shortages and to a poorer export performance than
could have been realized had attempts been made to smooth out export sales
33. Ibid., pp. 48 ff.
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during the year. Also, given Turkey's high share of world exports, it is signifi-
cant that little by way of promotional work has been done. Expert opinion
seems to be that had greater attention been paid to quality standardization,
marketing and smoothing out the seasonal pattern of exports, Turkish ex-
ports of figs could have been much greater than their actual levels.34
Chrome
Of all Turkey's major exports, chrome has had the worst performance.
Earnings from chrome exports decreased at an average annual rate of 4.4 per
cent over the period 1950 to As indicated in Table VIl-3, the
Turkish share of the world chrome market was 18 to 20 per cent during the
1950's, declined to a low of 9.9 per cent in 1963, and rose thereafter to 123
per cent in 1969.
Table VI1.1 1gives data on the production and exports of chrome. Many
factors, both domestic and international, have contributed to its poor per-
formance. During the late 1950's the minimum export price for chrome was
substantially above world market levels. Moreover, as seen in Chapter II, lack
of transport equipment and failure to obtain imports even for replacement of
machinery and equipment led to high costs at the mines, so that production
and exports declined. On the international front, new low-cost sources of
chrome were developed in other countries, and aluminum and stainless steel
were substituted for chrome in many of its uses.
In the early 1960's the Turkish export prices were again set above interna-
tional levels, with further losses in Turkey's share of the world market.
Chrome was one commodity for which price registration practices did ad-
versely affect exports in the 1960's. Internal rail charges for exportable
chrome became a major problem, as the price of shipping a ton to port was
$13 per ton compared with production costs of $10 a ton at high-cost mines
and a unit export price of $20 (see Table Vu-h).36
By the late 1960's there were some increases in investment in the mining
sector. The first signs of revival in chrome output came in 1969. Output even
then was still only 651 thousand long tons, contrasted with an average annual
production of 785 thousand long tons in the l957-to-1958 period. There is
no evidence that the decline in production was associated with a decrease in
economic reserves. On the contrary, Turkish reserves continue to be among
the richest and largest in the world.
34.TurkishExports, USAID,op.cit. (Note 30),pp.13—14.
35,The estimated regression equation for the time trend was:
=21.2(0.955)witht =0in 1950. R2 =0.26;standard error =0.018.
36.TurkishExports, USAID,op.cit. (Note 30), p. 23.
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Note:Tons are long tons.
Sources:Statistical Summary of the Mineral Industry, op. cit. (Table VIl-3); and Inter-
national Financial Statistics, various issues.
Although it is difficult to document, it appears that the entire range of
governmental policies has contributed to the failure of chrome exports to
expand. It is perhaps suggestive of this that neither the FFYP nor the SFYP
contained any discussion of the decline in chrome exports. In the FFYP, it
was projected that chrome exports would increase from the estimated level of
400,000 metric tons in 1962 to 500,000 metric tons in 1967. In the SFYP
chrome exports were projected to remain constant at 500,000 metric tons per
annum throughout the Second Plan period. Domestic production was ex-
pected to increase at an average annual rate of 3.1 per cent but (without
explanation) the entire increment was expected to be absorbed by domestic
demand. Given the perceived foreign exchange stringency at the time the
SFYP was formulated, it is remarkable that little consideration was given to
increasing chrome exports.204
Copper
The Determinants of Turkish Exports
Although copper export earnings have grown at an average annual rate of
4.3 per cent, overall export performance has been relatively poor, especially
in view of world market conditions.37 As seen in Table VlI-3 the Turkish
share of the world copper market has fallen from 1 per cent to 0.5 per cent
since the mid-1950's. Table VIl-12 gives the basic data.
Most of the growth in export earnings can be seen to have originated from
Table Vll-12





















































































































Note:Tons are long tons.
Sources:Production and export data from Statistical Summary of Mineral Industries,
op. cit. (Table VII-3). International price is the U.K. wholesale price, Inter-
national Financial Statistics.
37. The fitted time trend is ECOt =6.4(l.043)t,with t =0in 1950, R2 =0.20,and the
standard error of the trend, 0.021.
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amore favorable international price rather than significant increases in export
volume. As with chrome, high freight charges have been a problem for copper
exports. Similarly, production stagnated in the late 1950's and early 1960's
due to high domestic costs relative to international prices.
Part of the decline in copper exports in the late 1960's was offset by
increased domestic refining of copper and exports of manufactured copper.
As of 1970, however, the increase in manufactured copper exports was not
sufficient to offset the decline in copper exports. Considerable emphasis was
placed on the development of a domestic refining industry in the SFYP, and
some observers believe this will result in sizeable expansion of manufactured
copper exports in the 1970's. Despite that, the diagnosis as of 1971 must be
that the performance of copper exports was as poor, relative to international
marketconditions, as that of chrome.
Minor exports
In addition to the commodities discussed above, Turkey has a variety of
minor exports, many of which have considerable export potential. Among
these products are lumber, wool, olive oil, minerals other than those dis.
cussed, fresh fruits and vegetables, processed foods, and a variety of manufac-
tured and handicraft products.
The picture that emerges from any review of export policy is that govern.
ment policy in general has not incorporated measures that would encourage
the development of these products as a rapidly growing source of foreign
exchange. This is true both of exchange.rate policy and of other sorts of
actions that might enable rapid growth of export earnings. For example,
Turkey's mineral wealth is much greater than current production and export
figures reflect. Government policy has generally favored public ownership and
development of mineral resources, yet many government-owned economic
mineral reserves have not been exploited. Turkey's proved reserves of borate
ores, for example, are the second largest in the world, and world consumption
of borates is increasing at an average annual rate of 10 per cent. Yet Turkey's
exports remain at about $5 million per year. Technical surveys have suggested
that a four.fold increase in borate production could be accomplished in a
relatively short space of time if the managerial, organizational and capital
resources were available for the purpose. Yet despite applications by private
firms to enter into joint ventures with foreign companies for the purpose of
investing and developing mineral production, government action was not
forthcoming.
World demand for lumber is also increasing rapidly, and the Anatolian
plain is clearly an area with a comparative advantage in lumber products.
Turkey's annual timber growth potential is about the same as Finland's, yet
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Turkish exports have averaged around $2 mfflion per year, contrasted with
Finland's $550 million (excluding paper).38 Investments in sawmills, ply-
wood and other fabricating facilities have been estimated to yield high rates
of return, yet efforts to develop these resources have been relatively small to
date.
Turkey's proximity to Europe and the Mediterranean climate of southern
Turkey suggest a strong comparative advantage in fresh and processed fruit
and vegetable exports.39 Citrus fruit exports averaged around $2 million in
the early 1960's, rising to $10 million by 1969. Similarly, processed food
exports rose from $10 million in the early 1960's to $20 million in 1969. As
will be seen below, there is considerable evidence that these exports are
sensitive to changes in the effective exchange rate.
With or without appropriate exchange-rate policy, other sorts of govern-
ment actions could have facilitated the growth of minor export industries,
but they were not forthcoming. The lack of standardization of grades has
been a frequent headache for Turkish exporters, and even those whose quali-
ty control has been adequate have found themselves suspect, given the failure
of their compatriots to conform to similar standards. Considerably more
could have been done to assist the many small producers of given commodi-
ties to organize export development and promotion. This is particularly true
in the case of export crops and the agricultural processing industries. As with
exchange-rate policy, government actions with respect to import-substituting
industries were much more strenuous than those for promotion of new
exports.
IV. The determinants of exports
As seen in Section III, direct government actions have frequently been the
dominant determinants of export performance, especially for the major agri-
cultural commodities, the export prices of which have not been reflected
either to domestic consumers or to domestic producers because of interven-
tion. It is nonetheless worthwhile to examine the degree to which Turkish
exports have been responsive to exchange-rate policy. To examine this ques-
tion, a simple model was tested statistically for a variety of exports.
In theory, as Turkish resources increased the transformation curve shifted
outward. Given the outward shift, the relative growth in export supply would
38. Turkey's standing forests are about half those of Finland, but with appropriate
conservation practices weather conditions would yield higher growth.
39. Wool and olive oil are two other commodities whose export performance could have
been considerably better. Turkey's share of the world market is very small in each,
and there is ample opportunity for increase in production and exports.The Anatomy of the Regime in the 1 960's 207
bea function of the price received for a given commodity relative to the price
of home goods. While such a specification is obviously too simple to capture
all aspects of export determination, it nonetheless has the advantage of focus-
sing directly upon the role of the commodity-specific PLD-EER as a determi-
nant of export earnings.40 Of course such a model is invalid for those
commodities where Turkish exports were large enough to affect the world
price significantly. But as seen above this was probably true only of figs,
tobacco and hazelnuts. And for hazelnuts the possibility of substitution with
other nuts raises a question as to the degree of monopoly power held by
Turkey.
As a proxy for the outward shift in the transformation curve, two variables
were used: (1) for agricultural commodities an index of total agricultural
production was used as the "capacity" variable; (2) for other exports time
was used as a proxy. An index of agricultural production was developed in
the following manner: the U.S. Department of Agriculture provides price
weights (at international prices) for each major agricultural commodity,4
and employs those prices to devise an index of agricultural production during
the 19 60's. Estimates of physical output by specific agricultural commodities
were obtained for the 1950's, and the outputs were then multiplied by the
price weights to devise a continuous index for the 1950-to4969 period. That
index was used throughout the regression analysis.
Since weather conditions lead to large fluctuations in agricultural produc.
tion, the use of an agricultural production index as an indicator of the shift in
the transformation curve has an additional advantage. Since weather factors
affect commodity production generally, an agricultural production index re-
flects weather variation and provides a good measure of total domestic capaci.
ty for agricultural commodities.
The relative price variable was constructed as follows. When a dollar ex-
port price series was available, it was multiplied by the effective exchange rate
appropriate to the commodity, and the resulting product was then divided by
the index of the price of home goods (from Table 1.5). Thus if an increase in
the relative price of an export commodity generated an increase in the quanti-
ty exported, the sign of the relative price coefficient would be positive.
In general, physical quantities of exports were employed as the dependent
40. It was initially anticipated that a variable to reflect the state of domestic excess
demand should also be employed, since that variable would reflect the net shift in
excess supply. The percentage rate of inflation did prove to be significant but not
quantitatively important. It was finally dropped from the regressions, since better
fits resulted from logarithmic estimation, and negative observations could not be
used.
41. Indices of Agricultural Production, 1960—1969, USDA Economic Research Service,
Foreign Regional Analysis Division, ERS-Foreign 265, April 1970.
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variable except in cases where no appropriate physical unit was available, as
with minor exports. In those cases the dependent variable was in units of
millions of U.S. dollars. Since the logarithmic form of the regression generally
differed little from the arithmetic and had the decided advantage that the
coefficients are easier to interpret, logarithmic estimates were used in all
cases.
International prices are assumed given and the dependent variable is in
physical units, so that the coefficients on the price terms indicate the percent-
age increase in exports resulting from a 1 per cent increase in the real domes-
tic price of the export commodity. Thus a zero coefficient implies that the
quantity exported is not affected by the real price of the export (PLD.EER
multiplied by the international price), and a positive coefficient is the per-
centage increase in export earnings resulting from a 1 per cent increase in the
PLD-EER, the foreign price assumed given.
One other factor should be noted. The Turkish export season for agricul-
tural commodities covers the last quarter of one calendar year and the first
quarter of the next. Therefore, in addition to estimating the supply response
based upon annual observations, an effort was made to determine exports
from the fourth quarter of one calendar year to the third quarter of the next.
Such a construction was not possible for all exports, although quarterly for-
eign exchange earnings were available for a number of major agricultural
export commodities. For those commodities the constructed
quarter annual export earnings figure was used as the dependent variable. To
take the 1959 crop as an example, exports from October 1959 to September
1960 were the dependent observation; 1959 agricultural production and the
prevailing real price of the commodity as of December 1959 were the inde-
pendent observations. When it was impossible to construct such a dependent
variable according with the export season, agricultural production lagged one
year was used as an alternative independent variable.
Table VII-13 gives the results of the computations. The first column indi-
cates the commodity and the units of the dependent variable. The "seasonal"
dependent variable is export earnings from that commodity in millions of
dollars, fourth quarter of one year to third quarter of the next. The second
column indicates the number of years for which data were available. All
variables except for time were estimated in logs. Pf.EER/PH is the foreign
price of the commodity times the EER for that commodity divided by the
price of home goods. Standard errors of the coefficients are given in paren-
theses.
As expected, the results for chrome, copper, hazelnuts and tobacco re-
flected no influence of the PLD-EER. In the case of the minerals, minimum
export prices, domestic transport charges and other government policies de-
termined export performance. As can be seen, the coefficient on time is
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tons 19 —1.5 (0.12)—0.12 (0.12)0.29
dollars 19 —0.36 (0.18) —0.23 (0.19)0.41
Copper exports
tons 19 0.65 (0.17) —0.01 (0.22)0.10
dollars 18 —0.07 (0.15)0.57 (0.21)0.35
Cotton exports
tons 19 3.33 (0.41) 1.14 (0.34)0.80
seasonal 15 3.47 (0.66) 0.99 (0.60)0.73
Hazelnut exports
tons 17 1.83 (0.50) 0.04 (0.09)0.67
tons 17 1.78 (0.37) —0.05 (0.08)0.75
Minor exports
dollars 19 1.19 (0.30) 0.81 (0.40)0.51
seasonal 15 1.80 (0.24) 1.34 (0.26)0.86
Mohair exports
tons 19 —3.09 (3.82) 3.05 (1.24)0.36
tons 19 —2.35 (3.30) 2.92 (1.21)0.35
Olive oil exports
tons 10 9.14 (6.75) 5.39 (6.04)0.23
tons 10 1.13 (6.91) 8.21 (6.37)0.30
Raisin exports
tons 17 0.61 (0.50) 0.17 (0.11)0.59
tons 17 0.91 (0.37) 0.10 (0.09)0.68
Tobacco exports
tons 19 0.42 (0.30) —0.01 (0.17)0.12
tons 19 0.45 (0.26) —0.04 (0.16)0.17
negative for chrome and insignificant for copper. In neither estimate where the
physical quantity of exports is the dependent variable is the relative price
coefficient significantly different from zero. The coefficient on relative price
for dollar copper export earnings probably reflects the influence of the auton-
omously determined foreign price on total export earnings.
The coefficient of the relative export price for tobacco exports is also
insignificantly different from zero, and even agricultural production (in either
form) isinsignificant. Given government price intervention policies and
Turkish monopoly power in the export market, the results are hardly surpris-
ing. The picture for hazelnuts is similar: the PLD-EER does not appear to210 TheDeterminants of Turkish Exports
have affected the quantity exported. In view of the government's direct inter-
vention in the hazelnut export market, it seems clear that direct intervention,
and not price policy, determined exports.
For cotton, where government intervention has been minimal, agricultural
production and the relative export price are both highly significant. The
results suggest that a 1 per cent increase in the real exchange rate led to a I
per cent increase in export earnings from cotton exports. The sharp decline in
cotton exports in the mid-1950's and the rapid growth in cotton exports in
the 1960's can thus be attributed largely to exchange-rate policy.
"Minor exports" were defined to be all exports except those for chrome,
cotton, hazelnuts, raisins, tobacco and wheat (since wheat was a major export
in the early 1950's and not exported in the 1960's). The dollar value of
exports had to be used as the dependent variable, and observations were
constructed by subtracting the value of the major exports from total export
earnings in each year. Minor exports averaged about $100 million in the
1950's and ranged from $133 million to $192 million in the 1960's. Given
that commodities such as figs and copper are included in minor exports, the
response of the commodity group as a whole to real exchange-rate changes is
high. The "seasonal" dependent variable performed better; but upon either
estimate, a 1 per cent increase in the real exchange rate resulted in more than a
0.8 per cent increase in minor export earnings. On a 1969 base, this would
imply an increase in minor export earnings of 51.9 million in response to an
increase of TL 0.1per dollar in the exchange rate. These results must of
course be interpreted with care, but they reinforce other available evidence.
There probably is considerable scope for export diversification and growth
along non-traditional lines with appropriate exchange-rate and government
policies.
Two minor exports for which data were available were olive oil and
raisins. Exports of olive oil were negligible before 1960. The production
pattern remains bi-annual: a good crop year is followed by a very poor one.
Since olive oil does not, therefore, conform to the fluctuations in agricultural
production, it is hardly surprising that the agricultural production variable
proved insignificant. Given the few degrees of freedom, the estimated coeffi-
cient of the relative export price is not significant. For what it is worth,
however, it is large.
Raisin exports had a positive coefficient on the relative export price varia-
ble, although it was insignificant. Given government intervention, the surplus
stocks of raisins in Turkey, and other factors, the result is not surprising.
Thus it would appear that except for cotton, Turkey's major exports have
probably been determined primarily by government domestic policies and
interventions in the export market rather than by the nature of the trade
regime itself. For cotton (where intervention is less pronounced) and for
T
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minor exports, the picture is very different. Exports of cotton and those of a
variety of smaller commodities appear to have been considerably influenced
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The general picture that emerges is one of strong bias toward import-
substitution in both exchange-rate and domestic policies. An important ques-
tion is what would have happened had Turkish policy been export orientated,
or at least geared to equal emphasis on export promotion and on import-
substitution. The fact is that cotton exports and minor exports grew much
more rapidly than did earnings from commodities subject to government
intervention. That happened despite the sizeable disparity in EERs between
minor exports and imports and the consequently greater price incentives for
expansion of domestic import-competing production. Failure to develop min-
erals exports, predominantly produced by SEEs, is perhaps most telling in
this regard, since there can be little argument about market potential for
those commodities.
What would have happened under an alternative government policy orien-
tation is conjectural by its nature. Available evidence, however, suggests that
Turkish export potential has not been given a chance. Insofar as pessimism
about export prospects has influenced the government's decision to focus
upon import-substitution there is little empirical support for such pessimism
and a considerable amount of evidence that export prospects might, under
appropriate policies and incentives, be fairly bright.
b